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Abstract
Is China’s public bureaucracy overstaffed? To answer this basic question
objectively, one needs to define public employment in the contemporary
Chinese context; survey data sources available to measure public employ-
ment; and finally, compare China’s public employment size with that of
other countries. Using a variety of new sources, this article performs all
three tasks. It also goes further to clarify the variance between bianzhi (for-
mally established posts) and actual staffing size, as well as other permu-
tations of the bianzhi system, especially chaobian (exceeding the bianzhi).
A key finding is that China’s net public employment per capita is not as
large as often perceived; quite the contrary, it is one-third below the inter-
national mean. However, it is clear that the actual number of employees
in the party-state bureaucracy has grown – and is still growing – steadily
since reforms, despite repeated downsizing campaigns. Such expansion has
been heavily concentrated at the sub-provincial levels and among shiye dan-
wei (extra-bureaucracies).
Keywords: size of government; bureaucracy; public employment;
overstaffing; bianzhi; state capacity; Chinese state statistics
Discussions of the woes of governance in China almost never fail to criticize the
mounting size of the party-state bureaucracy.1 Before market reforms, the
party-state apparatus was said to be “not only gigantic and unwieldy, but also
highly stratified.”2 Following reforms, the bureaucracy grew even faster. Its
growth is reportedly “staggering” compared to other matured market econom-
ies.3 “State sprawl” in the countryside triggered peasant burdens and protests.4
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Administrative bloat “ate up most available resources” and contributed to severe
township debts.5 Some argued that bureaucratic overstaffing represents weakened
state capacity in the country.6
Is China’s public bureaucracy overstaffed?7 Although the issue of bureaucratic
bloat has been subject to popular censure in the scholarly literature and media,
few have provided thorough empirical analyses of China’s public employment
size.8 Previous studies, while laying important groundwork, have been limited
to case studies of one or a few localities, or national-level descriptions based
on publicly available statistical yearbooks and press reports. Yet, to evaluate
objectively if the Chinese bureaucracy is overstaffed, we need to accomplish
three basic tasks.
First, we need to specify the meaning of the generic term public employment in
the contemporary Chinese context and in view of administrative reforms in the
last decade. Providing such a definitional framework is necessary to situate
China in comparative discussions. Second, we need to evaluate the range of
sources available for measuring public employment size and to decide which is
most appropriate for analysis. Third, we need to compare the Chinese bureauc-
racy with that of other countries and to disaggregate patterns of public employ-
ment growth within China. After all, size is relative. If one claims that China’s
bureaucracy is “too big,” then one needs to show that other national bureauc-
racies are indeed smaller.
This article aims to accomplish all three of the above. Additionally, by drawing
on extensive fieldwork and interviews,9 it clarifies the variance between bianzhi编
制 (formally established positions) and actual staffing size. It also identifies local
permutations of the bianzhi system, including chaobian 超编 (exceeding the
bianzhi), jiebian 借编 (borrowing bianzhi), hunbian 混编 (mixing bianzhi) and
kunbian捆编 (combining two bianzhi in one member of staff). An understanding
of the public staffing system is important before interpreting and measuring
Chinese public employment.
A few caveats are in order before proceeding. First, I refer to “cadres” in the
title to reflect the common usage of the term “cadres” (ganbu干部) in the Chinese
5 Ibid., 115; Oi and Zhao 2007.
6 Lü 2000; Pei 2006.
7 In the rest of this article, “bureaucracy” refers to “public bureaucracy” unless otherwise indicated.
8 Lee briefly surveyed the growth and distribution of cadres in the 1980s. Blecher and Shue described the
expansion and elaboration of local bureaucratic apparatus in the case study of a county government.
Brødsgaard and Burns provide the most recent and comprehensive accounts on bureaucratic staffing
respectively. The World Bank also published an informative annex on Chinese public employment.
For details, see Lee 1991; Blecher and Shue 1996; Brødsgaard 2002; Burns 2003; World Bank 2002.
9 From 2006 to 2011, I interviewed 265 cadres across localities and departments. Interviews cited in this
article are mainly with cadres in the local personnel management (renshi ju) and establishment offices
(bianban), 33 in total. To retain interviewees’ anonymity, I do not name them or reveal the specific
location. Instead, I cite interviews by year in which the first interview was conducted, an ID assigned
to the interviewee, followed by the unit in parenthesis. To avoid the possibility of identification,
I only identify the unit in broad sector categories (e.g. finance, personnel management, education,
organization), but not the full name of the unit and division.
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literature. However, later in the analysis, I show how the transformed meaning of
cadres, following market reforms, has complicated the task of “counting cadres.”
Second, while there are several dimensions to public sector size in the mainstream
literature, my focus in this article is on China’s public employment size.10 An
obvious reason for this is that bureaucratic overstaffing has been a prominent
issue in social science and popular discussions. For decades, the central govern-
ment has been trying to downsize public personnel. Public employment size has
also been used by scholars to develop broader theoretical arguments, such as state
capacity, corruption and political patronage.11 That said, for those who are inter-
ested, I have elsewhere analysed the scale of public and administrative spending
in detail.12 Third, limited by space, I do not discuss regional variation of public
staffing levels. There is in fact much theoretically interesting variation, but this is
also pursued in a separate article.13
The article begins by introducing the general definition of public employment
and then provides a framework for the Chinese context. Next, it discusses some
data sources available for measuring public employment, particularly previously
unused ones, as well as each of their pros and cons. I suggest that the best avail-
able national data are those compiled by the Ministry of Finance and the Central
Organization Department. The article then discusses in qualitative detail the pub-
lic staffing system. Importantly, I explain why we need to distinguish between
officially authorized and actual staffing levels, and use some new descriptive stat-
istics to estimate the extent of chaobian. The following section compares China’s
public employment size to that in other countries. I find that China’s net public
employment size per capita is actually below the international mean. However,
the level of public employment has steadily increased over the years, despite
repeated downsizing campaigns. Furthermore, such expansion had been heavily
concentrated at the sub-provincial levels and in the shiye danwei, what I call
extra-bureaucracies.
Defining Public Employment in the Chinese Context
In order to place China in comparative light, this article employs the generic term
“public employment” to refer to personnel employed by the public adminis-
tration sector. Analysts face significant methodological challenges in measuring
public employment across countries because there is no universal definition.14
That said, most existing analyses of public sector employment exclude personnel
in the military and state-owned enterprises and count only those working in
10 Following textbook accounts, there are three basic ways to measure the size of government: the number
of employees in the public sector; size of government expenditure to total expenditure or output; and
scale and scope of governmental activities. See Rosen 2005, 10–13; World Bank 1997, 33.
11 See Pei 2006; Lü 2000; Yang 2004; Grzymala-Busse 2007; O’Dwyer 2006; Ang 2011.
12 See Ang 2012.
13 Ang 2011.
14 Heller and Tait 1984; Schiavo-Campo et al. 1997.
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public bureaucracies, including ministries, regulatory agencies and public service
providers like schools and hospitals. The reason for this norm of definitional
scope is that military and state-owned enterprises are managed very differently
from public bureaucracies, and further, data on military personnel are generally
lacking.
According to the common definition of public employment, then, who should
be counted as a public employee in China? Is the Chinese concept of “cadres”
equivalent to public employees? Is the more modern term “civil servants” equiv-
alent to cadres and to public employees?
Let us first consider the meaning of cadres. As Doak Barnett explained in his
classic study of the bureaucracy, the concept of cadre grew from the revolution-
ary movement, and cadres were seen as the leaders of the masses.15 However, fol-
lowing the CCP’s state-building efforts, the concept shifted beyond the
revolutionary context and into one of bureaucratization. As such, Hung-Yung
Lee wrote, “the current Chinese concept of cadre includes two analytically dis-
tinct categories: the political elite and the functionaries staffing the huge
party-state apparatus.”16 Much of the recent literature continues to use the
term “cadres” because, as Barnett pointed out decades ago, this is a stratum of
individuals distinguished from the masses by their power and authority.17
During the socialist days, cadres broadly included officials in the Party and
state organs, local commune and team leaders, and non-administrative personnel,
but excluded military officials and workers in production units.18
Modernization of the Chinese administration in recent years has refined the
previously fuzzy and revolution-based concept of cadres. Most significantly,
the passage of the Civil Service Law in 2006 created a formal category of public
personnel known as civil servants (gongwuyuan公务员). West European govern-
ments established civil services over a century ago.19 In comparison, the Chinese
civil service is in its infancy. Civil servants form the elite strata of functionaries
in the party-state hierarchy. They usually assume administrative or leadership
roles. The remaining public personnel are formally titled shiye renyuan (personnel
of the shiye units 事业人员).20 Civil servants and shiye personnel are each man-
aged by a different pay and promotion scale. Nevertheless, in practice, as shown
below, the line between civil servants and non civil servants remains blurred.
To answer the questions posed earlier, the generic term “public employee” is
premised on the establishment of a politically neutral, modernized public
15 Barnett and Vogel 1967, 39–41.
16 Lee 1991, 5.
17 Barnett and Vogel 1967, 39.
18 Ibid., 40.
19 E.g. the British government formally established its civil service in 1855, with the creation of the Civil
Service Commissioners and civil service examinations.
20 To be more precise, there is a third and mixed category of public personnel, known as canzhao gong-
wuyuan shiye renyuan (literally shiye personnel who are managed according to the civil service scheme).
These are functionaries who perform administrative roles like civil servants but occupy shiye rather than
xingzheng bianzhi. More about the bianzhi system will be discussed in the next section.
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administration. Thus, “cadres” is not synonymous with public employees, though
their scope is roughly similar, as the former reflects a revolutionary setting unique
to communist regimes like China and the former Soviet Union. “Civil servants”
can be understood as an elite sub-group among personnel working in the
party-state apparatus. Not all public employees in the contemporary context
are civil servants.
So who would count as public employees in the contemporary setting? We
would include all personnel serving in the Party (dang 党), government (zheng
政), subsidiary (shiye 事业), and Party-run social (shetuan 社团) organs, but
exclude the military and state-owned enterprises. To elaborate further, units in
the Party and governmental hierarchies can be divided into two kinds: core
bureaus ( jiguan danwei 机关单位) and extra-bureaucracies (shiye danwei 事业
单位).21 Core bureaus are responsible for political, administrative and regulatory
work. They are organizations that appear on formal organizational charts. Each
core party-state bureau has a cluster of subsidiary extra-bureaucracies attached to
them that perform a range of delegated tasks such as administration, public ser-
vices provision and commercial activities.22 Extra-bureaucracies can be fully or
partially state-funded or wholly self-funded. It is thus the case that not all public
employees in China are on the official state payroll.23 Table 1 gives examples of
bureaus and extra-bureaucracies.
From a comparative perspective, the scope of Chinese public employment is
unique in several respects. First, whereas political parties and bureaucracy are
separated in matured democratic systems, the Chinese bureaucracy has two par-
allel lines of authority: the Party and the government. Thus, those who work in
Party organs count as public employees. Second, the Party operates a number of
social (or mass) organizations, like the Communist Youth League and Women’s
Federation.24 Those who serve in these organizations are not members of
an autonomous civil society; they are part of the bureaucracy. Third, not all
public employees in China are state-funded. One can work for a bureau or
21 The term shiye danwei has been translated variously into “business units,” “institutional work units,”
“government-funded not-for-profit organizations,” “public service units” and “service units.” I choose
to translate it as extra-bureaucracies for an analytical purpose. This translation captures the principal
feature shared among all shiye danwei: they are attached and subservient to a parent agency.
22 Shiye danwei are public organizations, even if they provide commercialized services. They should be
distinguished from private companies ( jingji shiti/gongsi) operated by local state bureaus and extra-
bureaucracies in the 1980s and early 1990s. For an elaboration of the distinction between the two organ-
izational types, see Ang 2009, ch. 2.
23 This is contrary to long-held assumptions that Chinese cadres are necessarily state-funded personnel.
E.g. Barnett wrote that state cadres are “those on the state payroll in the government, party, or mass
organizations.” See Barnett and Vogel 1967, 40; Lee 1991, 5. Furthermore, in principle, although
administrators in the core jiguan danwei (i.e. civil servants in recent terminology) should be fully state-
funded, in practice, they may not be. I have encountered the case of civil servants in a city-level tourism
bureau who were entirely self-funded since the bureau was first established until a few years ago. AI
2007-108.
24 Social organizations are neither jiguan nor shiye. They are in the special category of shetuan. Employees
of these organizations have the special status of “proxy civil servants” (canzhao gongwuyuan). They fol-
low the management scheme of civil servants but occupy shiye rather than xingzheng bianzhi. AI
2007-39 (youth league); AI 2008-137 (personnel).
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extra-bureaucracy without receiving budgeted funds, or only a portion of them,
for one’s compensation. In these cases, the hiring unit has to generate funds out-
side budget allocations to finance the extra personnel.
Comparing Data Sources of Public Employment in China
Having defined the scope of public employment, we can now attempt to measure
it. There are various data sources. Each provides a slightly different measure of
“public employment.”
China Statistical Yearbooks
The most commonly used sources are the China Statistical Yearbooks
(Zhonggguo tongji nianjian), published by the National Statistical Bureau, and
the Labour Statistical Yearbooks (Laodong tongji nianjian).25 These list the num-
ber of employees in broad categories of “Party, government and social organiz-
ations,” “education, culture and media,” “health, sports and social welfare,” and
“social services.” While publicly available, these sources have shortcomings.
They do not distinguish between publicly employed and privately employed per-
sonnel in each sector. So in “education, culture and media,” for example, private
school teachers could be included and to count all the employees in this category
as public employees would give an overestimate. Conversely, these sources can
lead to underestimation. There are public bureaucracies and public employees
in sectors like finance, real estate and transportation. They will be excluded
from existing studies that employ the statistical yearbooks.
Table 1: Examples of Core Bureau and Extra-Bureaucracies
Example of a core bureau
( jiguan danwei)
Example of an extra-bureaucracy
(shiye danwei)
Party system Local Party committee Committee technical assistance centre
Organization department Party members e-learning centre
Publicity department Development research centre
Government
system
Development and reform
commission
Information centre
Civil affairs bureau Services centre for the aged
Construction bureau Projects assessment centre
Transportation bureau Drivers’ training centre
Education bureau Public school
Source:
City-level personnel bureau based in Jiangsu.
25 To cite some examples, statistics from the China statistical yearbooks were used by Brødsgaard 2002;
Burns 2003; Lü 2000, ch. 5; Yang 2004.
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Statistics from the Central Organization Department
Another useful data source is the Organizational History Statistics (Zuzhishi
ziliao), compiled by the CCP Central Organization Department. This provides
a useful and reliable source on the number of “cadres” from the 1950s until
1998. In the Organizational History Statistics, the term “cadre” broadly includes
non-worker-class personnel in the administrative and subsidiary sectors, as well
as “technical workers” ( jishu renyuan) in the bureaucracy. By checking this
against other data sources, we can surmise that “technical workers” refer to low-
level service personnel in the public bureaucracies, but not the workers in
state-owned enterprises. This data source breaks down the number of cadres
by region, rank, gender, Party membership and so on. However, a major draw-
back of this source is that it has not been updated since 1998.
Statistics from the Finance Authorities
The Ministry of Finance has two neibu (internally circulated) publications that
contain statistics on public employment: the Local Financial Statistics (Difang
caizheng ziliao) and City and County Financial Statistics (Dishixian caizheng
ziliao). These two sources provide the most comprehensive coverage of public
employment. Yet few have employed them. It should be noted that these two
sources each measure a slightly different scope of public employment. The
Local Financial Statistics measure “employment” (zhigong 职工) in the core
and subsidiary units. Besides state-funded public employees, they include
employees in “self-funded” (zishou zizhi 自收自支) extra-bureaucracies; these
are units that are part of the party-state apparatus but do not receive any budget-
ary funding. On the other hand, the City and County Financial Statistics measure
“fiscal dependents” (caizheng gongyang renkou 财政供养人口).26 This refers
to personnel who receive at least some wage funding from state
budget allocations. That implies the Local Financial Statistics has a broader cov-
erage than the City and County Financial Statistics.
Statistics by Local Personnel and Establishment Offices
At the provincial, city and county levels, some local personnel and establishment
offices have issued internal publications on the bianzhi system and public employ-
ment. The benefit of these sources is that they typically list the number of bianzhi.
This data source allows comparison of the number of officially established pos-
itions with actual levels of employment.
26 This data source was used by Shih and Zhang 2006.
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Other sources
Besides those sources listed above, previous reports also employed Chinese sec-
ondary literature, governmental directories and the state press. However, most
of these sources date from the early 1990s. Bits of information gleaned from
the state press are incomplete and lack reliability. Several books written by
Chinese scholars claimed that the bureaucracy is grossly inflated, but with a
surprising absence of systematic descriptive statistics and cross-national
comparison.27
The Bianzhi System versus Actual Staffing Levels
Central to analysing public employment in China is to clarify the bianzhi system.
Simply put, the bianzhi is a system for determining the functions of government,
the number of organs and the number of personnel employed in each organ.28
Since 1949, bianzhi management has been rotated between Party and government
in various bodies.29 In 1991, central authorities created the central establishment
commission and office (Zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui bangongshi 中央机
构编制委员会办公室), abbreviated here as the central establishment office. At
the local levels down to the county, there is a parallel establishment office (bian-
ban 编办for short) that manages the bianzhi.
In terms of staffing, every jiguan and shiye unit in the bureaucracy is allocated
a bianzhi by the local establishment office. The bianzhi specifies the maximum
number of officially established positions. It is divided into two types: administra-
tive (xingzheng行政) bianzhi and subsidiary (shiye事业) bianzhi. In principle, the
xingzheng bianzhi is reserved for administrative, planning or leadership posts,
namely civil servants, whereas the shiye bianzhi applies to remaining public
employees in the middle to low ranks such as technical workers, clerical staff
and school teachers. According to personnel officials, xingzheng bianzhi is strictly
controlled. The central establishment office decides a fixed quota for the entire
hierarchy and then distributes this quota level by level. In contrast, shiye bianzhi
is deliberately managed in a flexible system (dongtai guanli动态管理).30 The cen-
tral government does not dictate a fixed number of shiye bianzhi for each level.
Each province decides a criterion for itself. For example, in Shandong, a ratio
system is used to determine the number of shiye bianzhi, such as X bianzhi for
every Y number of patients treated by a public hospital.31
The bianzhi functions as a staffing guideline and budgeting instrument. In
terms of staffing, it provides a guide to the desired size of each public unit.
27 See Liu 2003; Wang 1998.
28 For a detailed description of the bianzhi system and its distinction from the nomenklatura, see
Brødsgaard 2002; Brødsgaard 2009, ch. 7.
29 Burns 2003, 778–79.
30 AI 2007-36 (personnel); AI 2007-75 (personnel); AI 2007-76 (personnel); AI–2007-77 (personnel); AI
2008-137 (personnel); AI 2010-212 (personnel).
31 AI 2006-17 (personnel).
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For budgeting, bianzhi allows the finance authorities to determine the allocation
of budgetary funds for personnel spending for each department.32 In principle,
the finance authorities should only take into account the bianzhi, and not the
actual number of employees, when allocating funds. So, for example, if a bureau
has a bianzhi of 15 but employs 25 personnel, the local finance bureau should
only need to allocate funds to pay for 15 employees.33 For the remaining staff,
the bureau in question will have to appropriate its office budget (bangong jingfei
办公经费) or generate extra funds to finance them, typically from collecting fees
and fines or by delivering profit-making services. However, in practice, there are
instances where budgeting officials pay for personnel hired beyond the quota.
Chaobian: exceeding the bianzhi
Although the local establishment offices assign a bianzhi to every unit, they are
often unable to enforce this guideline in practice. This leads to the notorious pro-
blem of chaobian, literally translated as exceeding the number of established
posts. Chaobian is often cited but seldom explained. I asked local personnel offi-
cials for examples of it, which can take several forms.
The first kind of chaobian occurs when a unit reaches its bianzhi limit but con-
tinues to hire more. Hiring beyond the bianzhi can happen for valid and political
reasons. There are numerous instances in which bureaucracies, especially public
service providing units like schools and hospitals, need more personnel but do not
have more bianzhi. There are also occasions when local leaders and department
chiefs arrange positions for relatives and friends in the bureaucracy, thus forcing
local units to chaobian.34 Employees hired beyond the bianzhi are termed bianwai
编外 (outside the bianzhi) personnel, and are typically funded using the hiring
unit’s self-generated revenue. As a local establishment office bureaucrat
explained:
Bianwai personnel may or may not be on the state payroll. If the unit has its own income, it can
use that income to feed the additional staff members. But our bianzhi control is stricter nowa-
days. Those who are not recognized by us [the establishment office] will also not be recognized
by the finance office.35
A second type of chaobian happens when a unit has not in fact breached its
bianzhi, but claims that it has or inflates its bianzhi to extract more budgetary
funding.
For example, a unit has bianzhi of 40. But when they submit a budget request, they claim that
they have 60. So in this case, they chaobian by 20. Chaobian is something that happens when
there is a failure of coordination between the Establishment Office and the Finance Bureau.36
32 For a reference to the budgeting function of bianzhi, see Mertha 2005, 798, n. 24.
33 AI 2010-212 (personnel).
34 E.g. at a county-level legal aid office, the few authorized positions available were occupied by the chil-
dren of local leaders, who were not qualified lawyers. The legal aid office was thus forced to hire bianwai
personnel. AI 20070-33 (legal affairs).
35 AI 2007-48 (personnel).
36 AI 2007-36 (personnel).
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In a third situation, a public unit has its bianzhi cut during a downsizing exer-
cise, and in consequence, there is chaobian even though the unit did not “over-
hire.” Chaobian also results from central policies requiring local governments
to absorb excess military personnel into local bureaucracies.
Historically speaking, for every round of organizational reform, the bianzhi will have to be com-
pressed. A department may start with a 100 personnel, no chaobian. But with a new policy to
reduce bianzhi, say by 10 per cent, chaobian will result.37
Local governments have to absorb large numbers of demobilized military personnel ( jundui
zhuanye ganbu 军队转业干部). From 2005 to 2008, there was a major adjustment of military
personnel. Each year, over 200,000 military cadres were transferred to local governments …
These demobilized military personnel… 70 to 80 per cent of them enter core agencies to become
cadres and occupy administrative bianzhi. So with each new batch of military personnel coming
to us, there will be chaobian.38
The case above is a warning not to jump upon chaobian as a sign of local cor-
ruption or bureaucratic bloat,39 as such a phenomenon is sometimes a product of
top-down downsizing and central policies rather than bottom-up overstaffing.
There have been several rounds of bureaucratic downsizing in the post-Mao
era. Each time, the bianzhi is cut but not necessarily the sum of personnel.
When this happens, downsizing ironically creates chaobian. Moreover, it should
be noted that existing bianzhi standards are too slow to adjust to growing and
changing demands confronting local agencies and public service providers.40
For example, officials in a county of Jiangsu reflected that the criteria for shiye
bianzhi had not been updated for years and did not take into account a growing
number of migrants when calculating the county’s population. As a result, the
bianzhi was set too low for public providers like hospitals to operate effectively,
and chaobian became inevitable.41
Bianwai personnel are not unique to the Chinese bureaucracy. Analogous situ-
ations are found in other countries. For example, in the European Union admin-
istration, although the number of civil service positions is fixed, fully budgeted
and strictly enforced, agencies routinely hire additional “contract agents.”
These agents are hired via three-year contracts which can be terminated if necess-
ary, unlike civil servants, who are virtually impossible to fire.42 Contract agents
provide staffing flexibility and allow EU bureaucracies to get around formal hir-
ing restrictions. A key distinction between the Chinese case and most bureauc-
racies, however, is that while contract agents are always paid by state budgets
in the latter, Chinese local bureaus and extra-bureaucracies can generate extra-
budgetary or taxless revenue (such as fines, fees, user-charges) to finance bianwai
personnel and positions that are designated partially or wholly self-funded.
37 AI 2010-213 (personnel).
38 Ibid.
39 Pei 2006, ch. 4.
40 AI2010-212 (personnel).
41 AI 2007-123 (personnel); AI 2007-124 (personnel).
42 Author’s interview with civil servants of the EU administration, 4 October 2010.
Counting Cadres 685
Many observers claim that chaobian is a widespread and serious problem in
China. One author wrote that “chaobian could be as high as 50 per cent of formal
bianzhi” and that “the number of chaobian personnel could easily reach several
million.”43 Others estimate the number of chaobian at around 600,000.44 Such
speculations are made without a clear basis and tend to suggest that chaobian
is the result of local defiance against well-intended central policies.
A comparison of data on bianzhi and actual employment numbers can offer
some solid indication of the extent of chaobian. Below, I compare two data
sources on Fujian province in 2004. The first is the Fujian Organization and
Establishment Yearbook (Fujian jigou bianzhi nianjian), published by the Fujian
Provincial Establishment Office, which records the number of officially estab-
lished posts. The second is the Local Financial Statistics, which records actual
staff size by province, including those on the state payroll and those who are
not. The comparison is summarized in Table 2.
According to the Provincial Establishment Office, the total bianzhi in Fujian
province in 2004 was 863,102, while “the number of bianzhi filled” was
814,458. The latter term needs clarification. The bianzhi refers specifically to
the maximum number of established positions. As we see in Fujian, they are
not completely filled. But if bianzhi were still available, why would bureaus
choose not to fill all of them? Bianzhi is valuable to local bureaucracies. Being
included in the bianzhi lends public employees formal status and the privileges
of a cadre (such as retirement funds). For the hiring unit, a bianzhi gives the
right to bargain with the finance office for a bigger budget to pay wages.
Hence, each department (and the establishment office) will usually try to keep
some bianzhi vacant as “back-up.” This prepares them for when a new leader
comes to office and demands new personnel to be added. Furthermore, in the
event of downsizing, no one will have to be laid-off if there is surplus bianzhi.45
That said, an excess of bianzhi does not mean that there is no chaobian. The
finance authorities, as reflected in the Local Financial Statistics, recorded 1.2
million public employees in Fujian province. This implies that there are more
Table 2: Bianzhi, Actual Public Employment and Estimated Chaobian in Fujian
Province, 2004
Total bianzhi 863,102
Number of bianzhi filled 814,458
Total public employment 1,230,089
Estimated chaobian 366,987
Sources:
Total bianzhi and number of bianzhi filled from Fujian Organization and Establishment Yearbook; total public employment from
Local Financial Statistics; estimated chaobian, author’s calculation
43 Brødsgaard 2002, 369.
44 Gore 1998, 90; Zhong 2003, 44.
45 AI 2007-36 (personnel); AI 2007–107 (personnel)
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than 300,000 public personnel who are bianwai (see Table 2). This presents a
common paradox where there are surplus authorized positions alongside
over-the-quota staffing.
In sum, the number of bianzhi and the actual staffing are not the same.46
Hence, to measure China’s public employment size in a meaningful way, we
need to use data that gauges the latter rather than the former.
Other permutations of the bianzhi system
Besides the phenomenon of chaobian, there are other permutations of the bianzhi
system that deserve elaboration. One of them is jiebian, meaning borrowing
bianzhi. Here is an example of jiebian: a local education bureau has reached its
bianzhi of 40 but needs more staff. Instead of hiring more using its funds, the
bureau can “borrow” teachers from local public schools to work for it. The
benefit of jiebian is that the borrowing unit will not breach its bianzhi and at
the same time does not have to be financially responsible for excess personnel.47
It is usually a higher-authority unit that borrows bianzhi from a subordinated
unit. Another example I encountered is a county-level organization department
borrowing bianzhi from the environmental protection bureau, which the latter
could not resist as the organization department is a powerful bureaucracy that
governs cadre appointments.48 When understaffed, the lending unit is forced to
employ bianwai workers, typically at its own expense.
Another common phenomenon is hunbian (mixing bianzhi). In theory, civil ser-
vants (who occupy administrative bianzhi) should work in core bureaus, and non
civil servants (who occupy subsidiary bianzhi) should work in extra-
bureaucracies. In reality, however, civil servants can sometimes work in extra-
bureaucracies, and almost everywhere, there are shiye personnel who work in
core bureaus and perform the same administrative tasks as civil servants, but
do not share civil servants’ formal status, privileges and pay scales. Why does
this happen? As discussed, the CCP exercises tight centralized control over the
number of administrative bianzhi. Thus, xingzheng bianzhi is scarce. To get
around this, local bureaucracies have little choice but to use shiye bianzhi to
fill spaces in the administrative units.49 A problem with hunbian is that it creates
a confusion of responsibilities within local bureaucracies. An even bigger pro-
blem is that shiye personnel who perform regulatory tasks do not have the
legal authority to make or enforce administrative decisions and yet are tasked
with such responsibilities.
A third permutation of the bianzhi system is kunbian (combining two bianzhi in
one person). This describes a situation in which a public employee simultaneously
46 Some equate bianzhi with actual staffing size, but these are different. See Brødsgaard 2002, 67.
47 AI 2007-45 (education); AI 207-121 (education)
48 AI 2007-88 (environmental protection)
49 AI 2006-18 (finance); AI 2007-53 (civil affairs); AI 2007-55 (civil affairs); AI 2007-58 (civil affairs); AI
2007-123 (personnel); AI 2007-124 (personnel); AI 2007-125 (personnel)
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occupies a xingzheng bianzhi and a shiye bianzhi. For example, a civil servant in a
county legal affairs bureau occupied a xingzheng bianzhi in the agency and a
shiye bianzhi in an extra-bureaucracy subordinated to the legal affairs bureau,
the legal documentation centre. By doing so, he drew a civil service wage from
the former position and bonuses from the legal documentation centre, which gen-
erated income. “To be honest, I made a tidy fortune,” he said. It appears, how-
ever, that this lucrative practice is being progressively phased out as part of local
governments’ rationalization efforts. The above-mentioned civil servant was
eventually asked to choose among the two positions he held, and he chose to
remain a civil servant because it was more secure.50
Permutations of the bianzhi system reflect a broader trend of transition within
China’s public administration. In most public bureaucracies, it is easy to identify
who a public employee is, which unit hired him or her, whether the position is
authorized, and so on. Clarity of identities, roles and hierarchy is a defining fea-
ture of modern public bureaucracies, as Max Weber had pointed out.51 In most
public bureaucracies, such as the US, staff size is jointly determined by the per-
sonnel management office and budget office: departments submit a budget
request indicating the number of full-time employees; the budget is sent to the leg-
islature for approval and then enforced if approved.52 China, however, is still in
the process of creating a rational bureaucracy. Its budgeting processes remain
immature and jumbled. As a World Bank report noted, “One of the unique fea-
tures of the Chinese budgetary process, one which is left over from the planned
economy, is that the budget drafting and staffing processes are disarticulated.”53
Thus understood, various circumventions of the staffing system do not necess-
arily mean weak state capacity or loss of hierarchical control; they are necessary
adjustments to cope with an obsolete bianzhi system and fast-changing demands
on local bureaucracies.
How reliable are statistics on public employment?
Despite the transitional nature of China’s public administration, we can and
should still meaningfully discuss and measure public employment in the
Chinese context. We need to provide a definitional framework for public employ-
ment in order to situate China in a broader set of cases and in the mainstream
literature. Some may counter that existing data are not good enough to provide
reliable measures. Indeed, the possibility of underestimation exists in even the
best data sources because temporary and informally hired workers (linshigong
临时工) (such as drivers and janitors) are not included in official statistics.54
50 AI 2007-33 (legal affairs)
51 Weber 1968.
52 Author’s conversation with Katherine Naff, 12 October 2010. Naff is the co-author of Personnel
Management in Government: Politics & Processes (New York: CRC Press, 2008).
53 World Bank 2002, 152.
54 AI 2007-36 (personnel)
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Moreover, there are informal categories of substitute public employees, such as
farmers-as-cadres (yi nong dai gan 以农代干),55 which are even harder to
count. Nevertheless, such difficulties happen not only in China but in all
countries, including the US. In the American bureaucracy, there are seasonal
workers and contractors who “do not appear anywhere in the statistics.”56
Thus, reporting gaps in China are unlikely to skew comparative descriptive
analysis to a point where we should give up trying. It is reasonable to regard
available statistics in China as a measure of public employees who undertake sub-
stantive administrative and services tasks on a full-time and long-term basis. This
measurement approach is consistent with international practices.57
To obtain reliable statistics, we should also assess the strengths and limitations
of different data sources and choose the most appropriate among them. To illus-
trate, in Table 3, I compare the measure of public employment from four data
sources. Compared to statistics from the Organization Department and
Ministry of Finance, the China Statistical Yearbook underestimated the total
number of public employees by about 7 million. The figures reported in the
Organizational History Statistics and Local Financial Statistics are roughly
equal. The latter reported about 50,000 more public employees because it
included all retired cadres. There were 2.63 million fewer public employees
reported in the City and County Financial Statistics than Local Financial
Statistics because the former excluded personnel in self-funded units. By compar-
ing the available data sources, we can conclude that the Organizational History
Statistics and Local Financial Statistics provide the most comprehensive and
Table 3: Comparing Public Employment Measures Across Data Sources
Terminology for
public
employees
Total number of
public employees
in 1998 (million)
Total number of
administrative posts (or
now termed civil servants)
in 1998
China Statistical
Yearbook
Employees 33.74 10.79
Organizational
History
Statistics
Cadres 40.49 6.98
Local Financial
Statistics
Employees 40.54 Not available
County Financial
Statistics
Fiscal dependents 37.91 Not available
Note:
As the Organizational History Statistics contains statistics until 1998, we compare statistics across sources in the year of 1998.
55 Bernstein and Lü 2003, 103.
56 Heller and Tait 1984, 3. For another related discussion on “shadow personnel” in the American
bureaucracy, see Light 1999, 184–85.
57 Heller and Tait 1984, 3–4.
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accurate measure of Chinese public employment. So, in the descriptive analyses
that follow, we will use these two sources.
China’s Public Employment Size in Comparative View
This section compares the public employment size in China to other countries.58
The World Bank conducted an international survey of public employment using
data from the early 1990s.59 The findings are summarized in Table 4 and com-
pared with Chinese statistics. Based on the Organizational History Statistics, pub-
lic employment in China averaged 3.1 per cent of total population from 1990 to
1998, whereas local public employment as a share of population was 2.5 per cent.
Compared to other countries, the net size of public employment in China is
one-third below the global mean of 4.7 per cent. China’s net public employment
size per capita is 0.5 percentage points more than the average in Asia, roughly
equal to Latin America, but less than half of Eastern Europe, the former
USSR and OECD countries.60 Even if the Chinese government had under-
reported bureaucratic staff size by 100 per cent (which is a stretch), public
employment size per capita in China would still be smaller than in the countries
of Eastern Europe and the former USSR.
However, China’s local (provincial level and below) public employment size
per capita of 2.5 per cent is among the highest in the world, more than twice
the global average of 1.1 per cent. It outstrips the percentages of Africa, Asia,
Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Only the OECD countries
had the same density of local public employment as China. Thus, it is clear that
Table 4: Comparing Public Employment Size in China and Other Regions
Public employment as share
of population (%)
Local public employment as
share of population (%)
Africa 2.0 0.3
Asia 2.6 0.7
Eastern Europe and
former USSR
6.9 0.8
Latin America 3.0 0.7
Middle East and
North Africa
3.9 0.9
OECD 7.7 2.5
China 3.1 2.5
Global mean 4.7 1.1
Sources:
Schiavo-Campo et al. 1997; author’s calculation based on Organizational History Statistics.
58 For a previous attempt to compare China’s public sector size to other countries, see Brødsgaard 2009,
115–16.
59 Schiavo-Campo et al. 1997.
60 It is necessary to compare China across a wide spectrum of countries. One author concluded that
China’s bureaucracy was over-expansive because its public employment size is on par with Brazil.
However, Brazil’s bureaucracy was actually smaller than many parts of the world. See Huang 2004, 51.
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China’s public employment is heavily concentrated among local governments
compared to other countries. In fact, one may argue that given the complexity
of policy-making in such a populous country, China’s central government
employment may be too small.
Distribution of Public Employment Growth
Following state establishment in 1949, the number of positions in the Chinese
bureaucracy rose steadily, reflecting a process of bureaucratization. Then, in
the reform era, from 1979 onwards, the absolute and relative size of public
employment grew at a steeper rate. This is paradoxical since it might be expected
that a socialist state apparatus would be larger and grow faster than one moving
towards a free market economy.61 In 1960, there were 11 million public employ-
ees, 1.7 per cent of the population. Thirty years later, in 1990, the number of per-
sonnel had jumped to 33 million, or 2.9 per cent of population. By 2005, there
were 47 million functionaries staffing the entire party-state apparatus, according
to the Local Financial Statistics.
Since 1980, the central government has initiated several downsizing campaigns
to cut bureaucratic flab. The campaign of 1998, spearheaded by former Premier
Zhu Rongji 朱镕基, was the most ambitious. Central-level ministries went from
49 to 20, and staff size was purportedly trimmed by half. The provincial and sub-
provincial governments followed central orders in slashing personnel. It was said
that provincial bureaucrats were cut by up to 47 per cent, and the reduction goal
at the city and county levels was 20 per cent.62 Yet, as Burns cautioned, we
should not conflate official claims with actual results.63 As is evident from
Figure 1, the net number of public employees grew every year, even following
1993 and 1998, when two major streamlining programmes were implemented.
Taking into account population growth, the per capita size of public employment
increased from 1.5 per cent in 1972 to 3.7 per cent in 2005.
Clearly, from Figure 1, the Chinese bureaucracy has grown and is still growing.
It appears that instead of actually laying off cadres en masse, the Chinese govern-
ment has “successfully” downsized by slashing the number of organizations and
bianzhi.64 As shown in Table 5, the number of units (including Party, government
and subsidiary units) has steadily reduced over the years. By 2005, almost a third
that had existed in 1995 were eliminated. As a result, the average bureaucracy
hired twice as many employees in 2005 than ten years earlier, and the total num-
ber of employees undoubtedly grew.
61 A similar paradox of bureaucratic expansion was observed among post-communist Eastern European
governments. Analysts attributed bureaucratic expansion to party competition. In another article,
I demonstrated how political patronage drives public employment distribution in China in the absence
of electoral competition. See Grzymala-Busse 2007; O’Dwyer 2006; Ang 2011.
62 See Brødsgaard 2002, 375; Yang 2004, ch. 2.
63 Burns 2003, 776.
64 This is also observed in a case study of administrative reform in Hainan province. See Brødsgaard 2009,
91.
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The majority of public employees, about 80 per cent, are hired by shiye rather
than jiguan units. Public employment growth has been concentrated among
extra-bureaucracies. As discussed in previous case studies, extra-bureaucracies
were obliged to absorb excess staff from core bureaus, those made redundant
from downsizing, demobilized military personnel, university graduates and the
children of bosses in supervising agencies.65 Unlike core agencies, which were
limited to performing regulatory and planning tasks, extra-bureaucracies could
operate in the market and enjoy quasi-monopolistic rights or competitive advan-
tages in services provision.66 They thus enjoyed greater flexibility in generating
extra income and funding public personnel.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of public employment by levels of government:
central, province, city, county and township. It uses statistics from the Central
Figure 1: China’s Growth of Public Employment, 1954–2005
Sources:
1954–98 from Organizational History Statistics, 1998 onwards from Local Financial Statistics.
Table 5: Number of Units versus Number of Employees in the Party-State
Bureaucracy
1995 2005
Number of units 1,425,273 891,012
Number of employees (million) 38.31 47.78
Number of employees per unit 27 54
Source:
Local Financial Statistics 1995 and 2005.
65 See Burns 2003, 798–802; World Bank 2007, 38.
66 See Lam and Perry 2001; Ang 2009.
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Organization Department, which divides staffing size by administrative levels.
From 1954 to 1998, central-level public employment averaged 16 per cent of
the total, provincial level 17 per cent, city level 22 per cent, county level 34 per
cent and townships 10 per cent. On average, 66 per cent of public employment
is at the sub-provincial levels, with county governments having the largest
share. Since 1980, central-level staff size has grown from 12 per cent to 20 per
cent. Provincial governments have seen a falling share of public employment,
from 18 per cent in 1979 to 11 per cent in 1998. This could reflect a steady devo-
lution of responsibilities from provincial to sub-provincial administrations. It
could also result from tougher downsizing targets imposed on provincial govern-
ments than on sub-provincial administrations.
Public employment patterns at the township level deserve more elaboration.
Township governments have seen the largest fluctuation in public employment
size since the CCP took power.67 They registered an average share of 9 per
Figure 2: Public Employment by Levels of Government, 1954–1998
Source:
Organizational History Statistics.
67 From 1954 to 1998, standard deviation in public employment at the township level was 5%, half the
value of the mean. The standard deviation at the central level was one-third of the mean, at the provin-
cial level 20%, and at the city and county levels less than 15% .
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cent of total employment in the 1950s and 1960s, jumped in the 1970s, fell during
the 1980s and early 1990s, and picked up again from 1996 onwards. There is
likely to be more undercounting and miscounting of public employment
among townships than at higher levels of government, which is confirmed by
the unstable patterns. It is unclear whether the statistics on township employment
include all or some village cadres. It is also unclear how “cadres” are defined at
the township level, where concepts of organization and bianzhi are muddled even
in recent times. Anecdotal evidence suggests that bureaucratic over-staffing is
most severe among township governments. Unfortunately, data from the
Central Organization Department do not extend beyond 1998. Following
major rural tax reforms and administrative restructuring among townships in
the last decade, it will be interesting to see whether and how staffing levels
have changed at this level of government.
Conclusion
Is the Chinese public bureaucracy overstaffed? This is a deceptively simple ques-
tion, yet it is an important one. The issue of public employment size is central to
discussions that are significant in terms of both theory and policy about local
governance, administrative reforms and state capacity. The Chinese public and
media tend to view the bureaucracy as too big. Many scholars echo this popular
view. The central government has tried repeatedly to slash the cadre corps.
However, before we can draw informed conclusions about public employment
size, we need to accomplish a few basic tasks. This article attempts to guide future
efforts to measure public employment size. It defines public employment in the
contemporary Chinese context; assesses the range of data sources for measuring
public employment; and places China in comparative perspective. It shows that
China’s net public employment size per capita is not larger than most countries,
but public employment has certainly been growing and such growth is concen-
trated among sub-provincial governments and in the extra-bureaucracies.
Thus, we urge caution in making ungrounded claims about bureaucratic size
and in advocating draconian, indiscriminate streamlining. It is important to
look beyond the appearance of size and at less apparent issues of structure and
goals of governance.68 For example, is the bianzhi system still relevant in the cur-
rent market economy, where bureaucratic functions are changing rapidly and
where agencies can generate revenue to fund their own positions? Is the distri-
bution of public employment across levels of government aligned with the
responsibilities of each level? Have central policies to downsize been matched
by realistic strategies and financial resources to retrench excess cadres? So far,
from my interviews, it appears they have not. Unsurprisingly, the outcome has
been local circumvention of central policy and continued expansion of local
68 As Brødsgaard noted, streamlining exercises are not meant to abolish the state but to “redefine the goals
of the public sector.” See Brødsgaard 2009, 107.
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bureaucracies. And finally, there is in fact wide variation in staffing levels across
departments within any local government: some are clearly overstaffed, and some
are understaffed.69 Future research can benefit from paying more attention to
basic measurement issues and by taking into account variation in public employ-
ment distribution and growth across regions and levels of government, and within
each locality.
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